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1. Introduction 
What	if	your	peers	tell	you	that	you	should	disregard	your	perceptions?	
Worse,	what	if	your	peers	tell	you	to	disregard	the	testimony	of	your	
peers?	How	should	we	respond	if	we	get	evidence	that	seems	to	un-
dermine	our	epistemic	rules?	Several	philosophers	have	argued	that	
epistemic	rules	are	indefeasible.	I	will	argue	that	all	epistemic	rules	are	
defeasible.	The	result	is	a	kind	of	epistemic	particularism,	according	to	
which	there	are	no	simple	rules	connecting	descriptive	and	normative	
facts.	 I	will	argue	that	this	type	of	particularism	is	more	plausible	in	
epistemology	than	in	ethics.	The	result	is	an	unwieldy	and	possibly	in-
finitely	long	epistemic	rule	—	an	Uber-rule.	I	will	argue	that	the	Uber-
rule	applies	to	all	agents,	but	is	still	defeasible	—	one	may	get	mislead-
ing	evidence	against	it	and	rationally	lower	one’s	credence	in	it.	
Section	 2	 explains	 the	 problem	 of	 undermining	 and	 three	 possi-
ble	responses.	Section	3	explains	the	indefeasibility	view,	and	section	
4	 argues	 against	 it.	 Section	 5	 argues	 against	 contributory	 rules,	 and	
Section	6	contains	the	core	of	the	positive	proposal,	arguing	that	the	
problem	can	be	solved	by	understanding	epistemic	rules	as	hedged.	
Section	7	develops	the	proposal	using	a	generalization	of	the	concept	
of	admissible	evidence.	Section	8	extends	and	defends	the	resulting	
position	—	where	the	only	unhedged	rule	is	a	single	Uber-rule.	Section	
9	compares	our	position	to	Quinean	holism.	Section	10	concludes.
2. The Problem of Undermining and Three Responses
In	this	section	I	will	explain	the	problem	of	undermining,	and	the	re-
sponse	that	epistemic	rules	are	indefeasible.	In	the	next	section	I	will	
argue	that	this	response	is	ad	hoc.
Consider	some	epistemic	rules	that	have	been	discussed	in	the	re-
cent	literature:
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Third,	the	normative	concepts	in	the	consequent	should	be	under-
stood	in	the	epistemic	sense,	as	opposed	to	the	pragmatic	or	any	other	
sense.	For	example,	if	you	are	offered	$1m	to	believe	in	God,	there	is	a	
sense	in	which	you	ought	to	believe	in	God.	I	am	not	concerned	with	
this	pragmatic	sense	of	‘should’.	
Fourth,	 the	normative	 concepts	 in	 the	 consequent	 should	be	un-
derstood	as	relative	to	the	agent’s	situation.	There	is	a	sense	of	‘ought’	
in	which	you	ought	to	believe	p	iff	p	is	true.5	There	is	also	a	sense	of	
‘ought’	in	which	you	ought	to	believe	p	iff	p	is	justified	in	your	situa-
tion.	It	is	this	latter	sense	which	I	will	use.6
Fifth,	I	take	‘defeasible’	to	mean	‘can	be	rationally	doubted’.	
Sixth,	I	will	call	rules	like	these	“simple”	to	distinguish	them	from	
the	complicated	Uber-rule	I	will	defend	in	sections	6	and	7.
Seventh,	 the	 antecedents	 contain	 specific	 positive	 claims	 about	
agents’	states,	but	do	not	contain	totality	facts	e.g.	 ‘the	agent	has	no	
other	perceptions/testimony’.
Our	problem	is	that	it	is	easy	to	generate	cases	where	narrow-scope	
rules	conflict	or	undermine	themselves.	For	an	example	in	ethics,	sup-
pose	a	crazed	murderer	asks	you	where	their	target	is.	The	principle	
not	to	lie	conflicts	with	the	principle	to	prevent	others	from	coming	to	
harm.7	For	an	example	in	epistemology,	suppose	a	table	looks	red	but	
you	are	told	that	it	is	blue.	Perception	conflicts	with	Testimony.	
The	epistemology	literature	has	focussed	on	cases	where	a	rule	is	
self-undermining.	Start	with	a	case	of	peer	disagreement:
Suppose	that	you	and	a	friend	independently	evaluate	a	
factual	claim,	based	on	the	same	relevant	evidence	and	
arguments.	You	become	confident	that	the	claim	is	true.	
But	then	you	find	out	that	your	friend	—	whose	judgment	
you	respect	—	has	become	just	as	confident	that	the	claim	
is	false.	Should	that	news	at	all	reduce	your	confidence	in	
5.	 See	Fassio	(2018	2.b.)	for	discussion	of	the	truth	norm	of	belief.	
6.	 Hedden	2012	p.	344.
7.	 This	is	a	problem	for	Kantian	ethics.	See	Timmerman	(2013).
Testimony	If	an	agent’s	situation1	includes	testimony	that	
x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	that	x.	
(Compare	Elga	[2007],	Titelbaum	[2015].)	
Perception	 If	 an	 agent’s	 situation	 includes	 a	 perception	
that	x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	that	
x.	 (Compare	 Chisholm	 [1966],	 Huemer	 [2000],	 Pryor	
[2000],	Boghossian	[2008].)2
Credence-chance link	If	an	agent’s	situation	includes	full	be-
lief	that	the	chance	of	x	is	y%,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	
required	to	have	credence	in	x	of	y%.	(Compare	Lewis’s	
[1980]	Principal	Principle.)3
Let	 me	 make	 some	 clarificatory	 comments	 about	 these	 rules.	 First,	
these	 rules	 have	 descriptive	 (by	which	 I	will	mean	 non-normative)	
concepts	in	the	antecedent	and	normative	concepts	in	the	consequent,	
making	them	narrow-scope	rules.4 
Second,	the	supervenience	of	the	normative	on	the	non-normative	
entails	that	there	will	be	some	such	narrow-scope	rules.	One	can	take	
them	to	be	grounding	principles.
1.	 The	term	‘situation’	is	used	by	most	authors	in	this	literature.	Titelbaum	offers	
a	definition	of	‘situation’:	“I	will	assume	only	that	whatever	the	true	theory	
of	rationality	is,	it	may	specify	certain	aspects	of	an	agent’s	circumstances	as	
relevant	to	determining	which	overall	states	are	rationally	permitted	to	her.	
Taken	together,	these	relevant	aspects	comprise	what	I’ll	call	the	agent’s	‘situ-
ation.’”	I	take	it	this	is	compatible	with	all	authors’	usages.
2.	 It	 is	 controversial	whether	 this	 rule	 requires	 a	 different	 treatment,	 as	 how	
things	look	is	not	a	psychological	attitude.	I	think	similar	rules	will	still	hold	
for	non-attitudinal	psychological	states,	but	it	won’t	matter	for	my	arguments.
3.	 Lewis	 formulated	 the	Principal	Principle	 in	 terms	of	 conditional	 epistemic	
probabilities	e.g.	Cr(A	|	Known	chance	of	A	 is	x	and	E)	=	x,	and	 I	do	not	
intend	 to	diverge	 from	this	version.	 I	have	used	a	conditional	 to	show	the	
similarity	to	the	other	rules.	More	on	this	in	section	7.
4.	 Narrow-scope	rules	have	the	form	[if	p	then	you	ought	to	believe	q].	A	wide-
scope	 rule	 would	 have	 the	 form	 ‘you	 ought	 to	 believe	 [if	 p	 then	 q]’.	 See	
Broome	(1999).
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without	 believing	 Testimony.	 So	 Elga’s	 argument	 against	 Testimony	
implicitly	assumes	that	rational	agents	are	never	Akratic.	
Although	 I’ve	 no	 interest	 in	 defending	 anti-Akrasia,	 I	 think	Anti-
Akrasia	is	plausible,	and	that	we	cannot	block	Elga’s	argument	by	sim-
ply	allowing	Akrasia.9	So	I	will	grant	Anti-Akrasia	and	block	Elga’s	ar-
gument	for	a	different	reason.
Returning	 to	 the	main	 thread,	 let’s	 distinguish	 three	 ways	 of	 re-
sponding	 to	 the	 self-undermining	 problem.	 One	 might	 ignore	 col-
leagues	and	maintain	a	high	credence	in	Testimony.10	When	it	comes	
to	your	belief	in	being	conciliatory,	you	should	stubbornly	ignore	your	
colleagues.	Conciliatoriness	is	indefeasible.	The	result	is	that	rational-
ity	 has	what	 Titelbaum	 calls	 “fixed	 points”	—	these	 are	 propositions	
expressing	 the	 rules	 of	 rationality,	 and	 they	 are	 indefeasible.	 These	
rules	have	built-in	restrictions	to	ensure	they	cannot	be	undermined,	
so	Titelbaum	calls	them	“restricted	rules”.
A	second	response,	which	I	will	defend,	is	the	view	that	you	should 
be	moved	by	your	colleagues.	Testimony	might	start	off	with	a	high	
prior,	but	you	can	get	evidence	against	it	and	decrease	your	credence,	
just	like	any	other	belief.	(And	if	you	rationally	disbelieve	that	some	
rule	is	a	requirement	of	rationality,	then	it	doesn’t	apply	to	you.)	I	will	
develop	this	view	using	the	distinction	between	hedged and unhedged 
9.	 See	Horowitz	 (2014)	 for	 a	number	of	 powerful	 arguments	 against	Akrasia.	
Elga	(2010)	doesn’t	mention	Akrasia;	Titelbaum	(2015)	discusses	Akrasia	in	
detail,	but	doesn’t	engage	with	Elga’s	argument.	Here	is	an	objection	to	my	
view:	“Your	position	is	that	there	are	no	simple	unhedged	rules;	as	Anti-Akra-
sia	is	a	simple	unhedged	rule,	how	can	you	assume	Anti-Akrasia?”	Response:	
On	the	view	I	will	develop,	if	Akrasia	is	ever	rational,	it	will	be	rational	only	
in	highly	unusual	cases,	e.g.	where	you	rationally	believe	that	an	expert	tells	
you:	 ‘p	and	you	should	not	believe	p’.	This	 is	a	strange	situation	(compare	
Worsnip	2018	p.	24),	so	we	should	expect	to	be	in	a	strange	belief	state.	No	
such	situation	arises	in	the	case	Elga	discusses,	so	I	don’t	think	allowing	Akra-
sia	is	a	good	way	to	block	Elga’s	argument.	(Note	that	the	rules	I	discuss	are	
narrow-scope	epistemic	rules,	while	Anti-Akrasia	is	a	wide-scope	coherence	
requirement	[Worsnip	2018].)	Thanks	to	a	referee	for	pressing	this	point.	
10.	 Elga	(2010)	and	Titelbaum	(2015)	defend	this	type	of	approach.	Elga	writes:	
“[O]ne	should	be	moved	by	disagreement	about	some	subject	matters,	but	not	
about	disagreement	itself	…”	(p.	184).
the	disputed	claim?	Conciliatory	views	on	disagreement	
answer	“yes.”	(Elga	2010	p.	175)	
Elga	(2007)	 initially	defended	a	conciliatory	view.	For	simplicity,	we	
can	consider	the	most	extreme	conciliatory	view:
Testimony	 If	an	agent’s	 situation	 includes	 testimony	 that	
x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	that	x.
But	Elga	found	that	many	of	his	colleagues	disagreed	with	him.	Elga	
writes:
Suppose	 that	 you	have	 a	 conciliatory	 view	on	disagree-
ment,	 but	 you	 find	 out	 that	 your	 respected	 [colleague]	
disagrees.	He	has	arrived	at	a	competing	view	(about	dis-
agreement),	and	tells	you	all	about	it.	If	your	conciliatory	
view	is	correct,	you	should	change	your	view.	You	should	
be	 pulled	 part	 way	 toward	 thinking	 that	 your	 friend	 is	
right.	In	other	words,	your	view	on	disagreement	requires	
you	to	give	up	your	view	on	disagreement.	(p.	179)
So	Testimony	 looks	unstable:	 if	Elga	 receives	 testimony	against	Tes-
timony,	 and	applies	Testimony,	he	must	give	up	Testimony.8	Concil-
iatory	 views	 sometimes	 call	 for	 their	 own	 rejection.	This	 is	 the	 self-
undermining	problem.
There	 is	 an	 important	 implicit	 premise	 in	 Elga’s	 argument	 we	
should	make	clear	–	Anti-Akrasia.	
Anti-Akrasia:	It	is	never	rational	to	believe	[x	and	I	should	
not	believe	x]
Without	Anti-Akrasia	a	rational	agent	could	believe	testimony	(i.e.	be-
lieve	x	 if	someone	tells	you	x)	and	also	believe	that	one	should	not	
believe	testimony.	The	former	is	the	lower-level	belief	x;	the	latter	is	
a	higher-level	belief	about	beliefs.	The	agent	would	follow	Testimony	
8.	 See	Elga	2010	p.	181–2	and	Titelbaum	2015	p.	271.
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Hedged Unhedged
Absolute Me,	Holton?	Väyrynen?	 
Sections	6,	7	and	8
Elga,	Lasonen-Aarnio,	
Titelbaum.	 
Sections	3	and	4	
Contributory End	of	section	6 Ross,	Christensen?	 
Section	5
I	argue	against	contributory	 rules	 in	section	5.	 I	will	defend	hedged	
rules	in	sections	6	and	7.	In	the	next	two	sections	I	will	explain	and	
then	argue	against	restricted	rules.	
3. Restricted Rules
Elga	 (2010)	 defends	 the	 first	 option	—	restriction	—	arguing	 that	 we	
need	to	make	a	modification	to	Testimony	to	make	 it	 immune	from	
defeat.	 Titelbaum	 (2015)	 builds	 on	 this	 and	 suggests	 that	 epistemic	
rules	have	the	following	form:13
Restricted Testimony:	 If	an	agent’s	situation	includes	testi-
mony	 that	 x,	 the	 agent	 is	 rationally	 required	 to	believe	
that	x	—	unless14	x	contradicts	[Testimony15].	
If	x	contradicts	Testimony,	then	ignore	x	and	continue	be-
lieving	other	testimony.16 
13.	 Titelbaum	 doesn’t	 actually	 defend	 Restricted	 Testimony.	 His	 point	 is	 that	
epistemic	rules	must	have	this	form,	whatever	they	turn	out	to	be.
14.	 ‘Unless’	means	‘if	not’.	Roughly,	if	there	is	no	contradiction,	then	believe	tes-
timony.	Notice	this	says	nothing	about	what	to	do	if	there	is	a	contradiction.	
That’s	why	we	need	the	next	line.
15.	 The	original	 text	says	 “this	 rule”.	 I	assume	 ‘this	 rule’	 refers	 to	Testimony.	 It	
won’t	matter	much	if	 it	refers	to	Restricted	Testimony.	I	argue	that	holding	
such	rules	to	be	indefeasible	is	ad	hoc,	whatever	their	exact	content	is.	
16.	 I’ve	 added	 “If	 x	 contradicts	 Testimony,	 then	 ignore	 x	 and	 continue	 believ-
ing	 other	 testimony.”	 Titelbaum	 isn’t	 explicit	 about	 how	 to	 respond	 if	 x	
rules.11	Hedged	 rules	have	 ceteris	 paribus	 clauses,	 stating	 situations	
where	 the	 rule	 fails	 to	 apply;	one	 such	 situation	 is	where	you	 ratio-
nally	disbelieve	that	some	rule	is	a	requirement	of	rationality.	I	will	ar-
gue	that	rules	of	rationality	are	hedged	—	one	can	always	get	evidence	
against	them	being	requirements	of	rationality.	The	result	is	that	there	
are	no	“fixed	points”,	no	rules	that	rational	agents	should	always	be-
lieve	to	be	requirements	of	rationality	—	all	are	defeasible.
A	third	response	is	also	worth	discussing.	There	is	a	different	way	
to	weaken	Testimony,	suggested	by	Christensen	(2010,	2013).12	Distin-
guish	absolute	and	contributory rules.	Absolute	rules	have	a	consequent	
that	says	that	you	are	required	to	be	in	some	state,	or	to	perform	some	
action;	contributory	rules	have	a	consequent	that	says	that	you	have	a 
reason	to	be	in	some	state,	or	to	perform	some	action.	Applied	to	epis-
temology,	absolute	rules	say	what	you	should	(or	should	not)	believe,	
whereas	contributory	rules	say	what	counts	in	favour	of	(or	against)	a	
belief.	Testimony	is	an	absolute	rule;	but	consider	a	contributory	ver-
sion	of	Testimony:
Contributory Testimony:	If	an	agent’s	situation	includes	tes-
timony	that	x,	then	the	agent	has	a reason	to	believe	that	x.	
Paradox	is	avoided	because	one	can	have	a	reason	to	believe	x	and	a	
reason	not	to	believe	x.	But	I	will	reject	contributory	rules	due	to	cases	
of	“valence-switching”,	i.e.	where	what	is	usually	a	reason	for	becomes	
a	reason	against.	
Here	is	a	map	of	the	main	positions,	the	sections	in	which	they	are	
discussed	 and	 (tentative)	 suggestions	 for	where	 some	philosophers	
might	be	placed:
11.	 See	Holton	2002;	Väyrynen	2006,	2009;	Schroeder	2004	section	5.
12.	 See	Dancy	(2013	section	1).	Christensen’s	(2010	p.	203–4;	2013	p.	92–3)	talk	
of	“ideals”	could	be	understood	as	talk	of	unhedged	contributory	rules.	His	
earlier	work	(e.g.	2007)	suggests	that	there	is	a	residual	bad-making	feature	
of	violating	ideals/rules,	in	which	case	the	rules	would	not	be	contributory.
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in	her	current	situation.	An	agent	can	reflect	on	her	situ-
ation	and	come	to	recognize	facts	about	what	that	situa-
tion	rationally	requires.	Not	only	does	this	reflection	pro-
vide	her	with	justification	to	believe	those	facts;	that	jus-
tification	is	ultimately	empirically	indefeasible.17	(p.	276)
But	this	is	very	hard	to	believe.	Christensen	(2013)	writes:
Suppose	…	that	I	follow	[Properly	Restricted	Testimony]	
and	 remain	 absolutely	 confident	 in	 its	 correctness,	 de-
spite	 the	 fact	 that	 it’s	 rejected	by	many	epistemologists	
I	respect,	and	even	rate	as	my	superiors	in	philosophical	
skill.	How	should	I	view	my	own	reasoning	on	this	topic?	
Should	I	 think	that	while	I’m	generally	only	moderately	
reliable	 when	 I	 think	 about	 philosophy,	 nevertheless	
when	 I	 think	 about	 arguments	 for	 general	 conciliation,	
and	for	not	being	conciliatory	about	conciliation,	I’m	es-
pecially	immune	from	error?	That	seems	extremely	dubi-
ous.	(p.	89)
Given	 the	 difficulty	 of	 formulating	 rational	 rules,	 the	 claim	 that	we	
should	be	certain,	or	even	highly	confident,	of	what	they	are,	even	in	
the	face	of	opposing	arguments,	seems	to	me	untenable.
Furthermore,	 suppose	 you	 do	 hear	 testimony	 against	 some	 (cor-
rect)	rule	of	rationality.	Titelbaum	suggests	that	you	should	not	believe	
such	testimony	to	any	degree.	It	naturally	follows	that	you	should	not	
17.	 Titelbaum	adds	a	footnote,	saying	that	the	rules	“could	be	opposed	by	empiri-
cal	evidence	pointing	in	the	other	direction	….	But	those	propositional	justi-
fications	are	ultimately	indefeasible	in	the	sense	that	the	empirical	consider-
ations	will	never	outweigh	them	and	make	it	all-things-considered	rational	
for	the	agent	to	form	false	beliefs	about	what	her	situation	requires.”	I	don’t	
understand	this.	If	empirical	considerations	can	count	against	the	rules,	why	
can’t	we	 imagine	 increasingly	 strong	 empirical	 considerations	 that	 eventu-
ally	outweigh	the	rules?	And	the	restrictions	he	places	on	the	rules	seem	to	
ensure	that	empirical	considerations	cannot	count	against	rational	rules	at	all.	
And	his	later	claim	(section	6)	that	the	Fixed	Point	Thesis	leads	to	the	Right	
Reasons	view	suggests	that	empirical	evidence	cannot	count	against	rational	
rules.
Restricted	Testimony	 cannot	undermine	 itself.	 It	 says	we	 should	be-
lieve	testimony	on	most	topics,	but	not	with	regard	to	the	question	of	
whether	we	should	believe	testimony.	It	follows	that	our	credence	in	
Restricted	Testimony	should	stay	the	same,	even	in	the	light	of	oppos-
ing	testimony.	Thus,	Restricted	Testimony	is	indefeasible	by	testimony.
Titelbaum	(2015)	defends	similar	restrictions	on	all	epistemic	rules,	
e.g.:	
Restricted Perception:	If	an	agent’s	situation	includes	a	per-
ception	that	x,	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	
that	x	—	unless	x	contradicts	[Perception].	(p.	273)
And	not	only	can	rules	undermine	themselves	—	they	can	undermine	
each	other,	e.g.	you	might	be	told	that	your	perception	is	unreliable.	To	
block	Restricted	Testimony	from	undermining	other	rules,	Titelbaum	
defends:
Properly Restricted Testimony:	 If	 an	 agent’s	 situation	 in-
cludes	testimony	that	x,	the	agent	is	rationally	…	required	
to	believe	x	—	unless	x	 contradicts	 [a]	 truth	about	what	
rationality	requires.	(p.	274)
This	structure	is	intended	to	generalize	to	all	rules,	e.g.:
Properly Restricted Perception:	 If	 an	 agent’s	 situation	 in-
cludes	a	perception	that	x,	the	agent	is	rationally	required	
to	believe	that	x	—	unless	x	contradicts	a	truth	about	what	
rationality	requires.	
Titelbaum	suggests	that	we	should	have	credence	1	in	the	rules	of	ra-
tionality;	they	are	indefeasible fixed points.	To	use	his	memorable	phrase:	
mistakes	about	rationality	are	mistakes	of	rationality:	
[E]very	 agent	 possesses	 a	 priori,	 propositional	 justifica-
tion	for	true	beliefs	about	the	requirements	of	rationality	
contradicts	Testimony,	but	I	think	he	must	be	committed	to	this	line.	I’ll	leave	
this	implicit	when	not	needed.
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This	 is	close	 to	saying	 that	 fundamental	 rules	are	 those	 that	are	not	
defeasible.	But	then	the	question	is:	Why	should	we	think	that	there	
are	any	such	rules?	Indeed	I	will	argue	that	there	are	none.
Elga	 argues	 that	 fundamental	 rules	 are	 dogmatic	 using	 the	 fol-
lowing	example:	Imagine	a	magazine,	Consumer Reports,	consistently	
rating	 itself	 as	 the	best	 consumer	magazine.19	When	 faced	with	 the	
complaint	that	the	magazine	is	biased	when	it	recommends	itself,	Elga	
endorses	an	editor	saying:	
To	put	forward	our	recommendations	about	toasters	and	
cars	 is	 to	 put	 them	 forward	 as	 good	 recommendations.	
And	we	can’t	consistently	do	that	while	also	claiming	that	
contrary	 recommendations	 are	 superior.	 So	 our	 always	
rating	ourselves	 #1	does	not	 result	 from	an	arbitrary	or	
ad	hoc	exception	to	our	standards.	We	are	forced	to	rate	
ourselves	#1	in	order	to	be	consistent	with	our	other	rat-
ings.	(p.	185)
But	I	think	this	brings	out	the	importance	of	the	distinction	between	
fundamental	and	non-fundamental	 rules.	The	advice	of	a	 consumer	
magazine	is	not	a	plausible	candidate	to	be	a	fundamental	rule,	and	
it	is	easy	to	imagine	cases	where	Consumer Reports	allows	that	its	rec-
ommendations	 can	be	defeated.	 Suppose	 the	 editor	 of	Consumer Re-
ports knows	that	her	rival	magazine	has	a	larger	budget	and,	as	a	result,	
makes	recommendations	based	on	more	evidence.	This	editor	should	
recommend	 that	 consumers	 rate	 this	 rival	magazine’s	 recommenda-
tions	over	those	of	Consumer Reports.	It	would	be	ad	hoc	for	the	editor	
to	ignore	evidence	against	her	magazine’s	recommendations.
It	 is	 only	 fundamental	 epistemic	 rules	 that	 are	 plausibly	 (non-ad-
hocly)	 indefeasible.	 Elga	 needs	 to	 argue	 that	 there are	 simple	 funda-
mental	epistemic	rules,	and,	to	get	the	consequences	he	wants	regard-
ing	the	peer	disagreement	debate,	he	needs	to	argue	that	Restricted	
19.	 Based	on	Lewis	(1971).
believe	you	have	any reason,	no	matter	how	weak,	to	reject	that	rule	of	
rationality.	We	are	led	to	the	view	that	what seems like evidence doesn’t 
even count as evidence.	 Lasonen-Aarnio18	 is	 sympathetic	 to	 this	 view,	
writing	that	it	“rests	merely	on	a	desire	to	avoid	paradox”	(p.	342).	But	
this	position	seems	at	least	as	paradoxical	as	any	of	the	alternatives.
So	where	did	we	go	wrong?	 I	will	argue	 in	 the	next	 section	 that	
Elga’s	(2010)	 initial	move	to	a	restriction	on	Testimony	—	a	move	ex-
tended	by	Titelbaum	—	was	a	step	in	the	wrong	direction.	
4. Elga’s Argument for Ubiquitous Indefeasibility
When	faced	with	a	rule	that	undermines	itself,	Elga	modifies	the	rule	
so	that	it	ignores	evidence	that	threatens	to	undermine	itself.	But	this	
looks	ad	hoc.	What	reason	do	we	have	to	believe	this,	other	than	the	
fact	that	it	avoids	the	undermining	problem?	After	all,	most	of	our	be-
liefs	are	subject	to	doubt	in	the	light	of	opposing	evidence,	so	why	are	
beliefs	about	disagreement	different?
Elga	argues	that	all	 fundamental	epistemic	rules	must	be	non-un-
derminable.	He	writes:	
In	order	to	be	consistent,	a	fundamental	…	rule	…	must	
be	dogmatic	with	respect	to	its	own	correctness.	(p.	185)
But	what	does	‘fundamental’	mean	here?	Elga	(2010)	writes:
a	fundamental	[rule]	is	one	whose	application	is	not	gov-
erned	…	by	any	other	[rule]	….	(p.	179)
18.	 “It	may	come	as	a	surprise	 that	 in	some	cases	a	state	can	be	perfectly	epis-
temically	rational	even	if	one	has	what	would	seem	like	strong	evidence	for	
thinking	that	it	is	not”	(Lasonen-Aarnio	2014	p.	342,	italics	added).	Although	
the	next	sentence	does	seem	to	count	the	apparent	evidence	as	real	evidence.	
And	 she	 then	 says,	 “That	one	 should	believe	 that	one	 shouldn’t	φ	doesn’t	
entail	that	one	shouldn’t	φ”	(p.	343).	So	it	seems	Lasonen-Aarnio	does	accept	
that	 there	 is	 evidence	against	φ,	which	affects	higher-level	beliefs	but	not	
first-order	beliefs,	and	thus	she	accepts	Akrasia.
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circumstances,	his	duty	to	save	the	child	[outweighs]21	his	
duty	to	meet	Betty.	(p.	256)
Let’s	say	that	rules	which	can	be	outweighed	are	contributory.	And	we	
can	take	it	that	the	distinguishing	feature	of	contributory	rules	is	that	
there	 is	 a	 residual	 bad-making	 feature	when	 they	 are	 not	 followed,	
even	when	not	following	them	is	the	right	thing	to	do	(due	to	other,	
weightier	 rules).22	When	 rules	 are	 voided,	 there	 is	 no	 residual	 bad-
making	feature.	In	this	section	I	will	argue	against	contributory	rules	
in	epistemology.
In	meta-ethics,	contributory	rules	are	associated	with	Ross	(1930),	
who	argued	that	we	have	numerous	duties,	and	what	we	ought	to	do	
depends	 on	 the	 overall	 weighting	 of	 these	 duties.	 In	 epistemology,	
the	analogous	view	 is	 that	we	have	numerous	epistemic	 reasons	 to	
believe,	and	what	we	epistemically	ought	to	believe	depends	on	the	
overall	weight	of	these	reasons.	We	can	make	this	explicit	by	weaken-
ing	the	consequent	of	our	rules:
Testimony:	If	an	agent’s	situation	includes	testimony	that	
x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	that	x
to
Contributory Testimony:	If	an	agent’s	situation	includes	tes-
timony	that	x,	then	the	agent	has	a reason	to	believe	that	x.
(Assume	 for	now	that	 the	 rule	 is	unhedged.)	This	avoids	 the	under-
mining	problems	above.	An	agent	who	has	testimony	that	x	and	a	per-
ception	that	not	x	has	a	reason	to	believe	x	and	a	reason	to	believe	
not	 x.23	No	 paradox;	what	 they	 should	 believe	 depends	 on	 the	 cor-
rect	weighing	of	these	reasons.	And	an	agent	who	doesn’t	believe	that	
21.	 Frederick	uses	 ‘overridden’	but	 I	prefer	 ‘outweighed’,	which	makes	explicit	
that	they	still	have	weight.
22.	 Schaffer	2015	p.	659.
23.	 Similarly,	 testimony	 against	 Testimony	 is	 compatible	 with	 Testimony	 still	
providing	a reason	to	believe	testimony.
Testimony	(or	something	similar)	is	among	them.20	But	no	such	argu-
ments	are	offered.	So	restricting	Testimony	to	make	it	indefeasible	is	
ad	hoc	after	all.	
Someone	might	object	that	what	is	fundamental	is	some	other	rule	
that	 is	 more	 complicated	 than	 Testimony	 (and	 Titelbaum	 takes	 no	
stand	on	what	the	fundamental	rules	are).	But	once	we	start	making	
qualifications,	we	are	on	the	path	to	the	Uber-rule	and	the	view	that	
all	rules	are	defeasible.	This	is	the	path	I	think	we	should	be	on.	Before	
presenting	my	positive	view,	 I	will	argue	in	the	next	section	against	
contributory	 rules	 in	epistemology.	 (Those	uninterested	 in	 contribu-
tory	rules	can	skip	the	next	section	without	loss	of	continuity.)	
5. Against Contributory Rules
Distinguish	two	types	of	defeasible	rules	—	rules	can	be	outweighed,	or	
they	can	be	voided	(and	possibly	both).	Frederick	(2015)	makes	the	dis-
tinction	as	follows:
[N]ormally,	if	Alf	promises	Betty	that	he	will	meet	her	for	
lunch,	Alf	thereby	acquires	a	duty	to	meet	Betty	for	lunch.	
However,	if	Alf’s	promise	to	Betty	was	made	under	threat	
of	force,	his	promise	fails	to	engender	that	duty,	because	
the	circumstance	was	duty-voiding.	
Normally,	 if	Alf	has	the	duty	to	meet	Betty	 for	 lunch,	
then	 he	 ought	 to	meet	 Betty	 for	 lunch.	However,	 if	 on	
his	way	to	meet	Betty	he	sees	a	child	drowning	in	a	pool,	
and	he	can	save	the	child	without	much	risk	to	himself,	
then	Alf	has	a	duty	to	save	the	child	….	If	Alf	cannot	both	
save	the	child	and	meet	Betty	for	lunch,	he	has	two	duties	
which	conflict.	Perhaps	all	would	agree	that	Alf	ought	to	
save	the	child;	but	his	duty	to	meet	Betty	remains.	In	the	
20.	This	is	worth	emphasizing.	Although	Elga	is	not	explicit	that	conciliationism	
is	 a	 fundamental	 rule,	 it	must	 be	one	 if	 Elga’s	 argument	 that	 fundamental	
rules	are	indefeasible	is	to	have	implications	for	conciliationism.	
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In	 the	 basic	 case,	 you	 are	 standing	 outside	 the	 library,	
when	you	 see	Tom	Grabit	 exit,	pull	 a	book	 from	under	
his	shirt,	cackle	gleefully,	and	scurry	off.	This	gives	you	
pretty	good	reason	to	believe	that	Tom	just	stole	a	book	
from	the	library.	
Case	2	 is	 just	 the	 same	as	 the	first	 case,	 except	 that	
Tom	has	an	identical	twin,	Tim,	from	whom	you	can’t	vi-
sually	distinguish	him.	In	this	case,	it	has	seemed	to	the	
judgment	of	many	philosophers	that	your	visual	evidence	
is	not	a	reason	to	believe	that	Tom	stole	a	book.	(p.	333–4)
But	Schroeder	thinks	your	visual	evidence	remains	a	reason	to	believe	
that	Tom	stole	a	book.	To	demonstrate	this,	he	extends	the	example:
Consider	a	third	version	of	the	case,	exactly	like	the	other	
two	except	that	in	the	third	case,	in	addition	to	Tim,	Tom	
has	a	third	 identical	sibling,	Tam,	from	whom	you	can’t	
visually	 distinguish	 him.	 This	 third	 case	 underwrites	 a	
compelling	argument	against	the	intuitive	judgment	that	
in	the	second	case,	your	visual	evidence	was	no	reason	to	
believe	that	Tom	stole	the	book.	For	if	you	go	on	to	con-
clude,	in	the	third	case,	that	Tom	stole	the	book,	then	you	
are	doing	worse	than	if	you	had	gone	on	to	conclude	this	
in	the	second	case.	Your	reason	to	believe	that	Tom	stole	
the	book	therefore	doesn’t	seem	to	have	gone	away	in	the	
second	case;	it	merely	seems	to	have	gotten	substantially	
weaker.	(p.	334)
Schroeder	seems	to	be	right	about	this	case,	where	the	defeater	weak-
ens	the	strength	of	the	reason.	But	I	don’t	see	how	he	can	say	the	same	
about	the	previous	case	in	which	a	drug	makes	blue	things	look	red	
and	red	things	look	blue.	In	that	case,	the	defeater	changes	the	valence	
of	the	reason,	i.e.	what	was	a	reason	for	becomes	a	reason	against.	So	
contributory	rules	are	still	too	strong.
Contributory	Testimony	is	a	requirement	of	rationality	still	plausibly	
has	a	reason	(a	weak	one)	to	believe	testimony.
My	objection	is	that	contributory	rules	say	that	a	feature	that	is	a	
reason	to	believe	x	is	always	a	reason	to	believe	x.	And	it	is	plausible	
that	 in	some	cases	a	 feature	 that	usually	 is	a	 reason	to	believe	x	be-
comes	a	reason	to	believe	not	x.	And	it	is	especially	plausible	in	epis-
temology	with	regard	to	Perception:
[I]n	a	case	where	I	…	believe	that	I	have	recently	taken	a	
drug	that	makes	blue	things	look	red	and	red	things	look	
blue,	the	appearance	of	a	red-looking	thing	before	me	is	
reason	 for	me	 to	believe	 that	 there	 is	 a	blue,	not	 a	 red,	
thing	before	me.	It	is	not	as	if	it	is	some	reason	for	me	to	
believe	that	there	is	something	red	before	me,	but	that	as	
such	a	reason	it	is	overwhelmed	by	contrary	reasons.	It	is	
no	longer	any	reason	at	all	to	believe	that	there	is	some-
thing	red	before	me;	indeed	it	is	a	reason	for	believing	the	
opposite.	(Dancy	2013)
These	 strong	undercutting defeaters24	provide	an	argument	 for	 reasons 
holism:	“a	feature	that	is	a	reason	in	one	case	may	be	no	reason	at	all,	
or	an	opposite	reason,	in	another”	(Dancy	2004	p.	7).	
The	consequence	here	is	that	even	the	contributory	version	of	Per-
ception	 is	refuted.	There	are	situations	 in	which	the	perception	of	a	
red-looking	thing	is	no reason at all	to	believe	it	is	red.	Similar	examples	
for	Testimony	can	be	devised,	perhaps	where	the	agent	finds	herself	
inside	a	logic	puzzle	on	the	island	of	Liars.	So	we	should	reject	con-
tributory	epistemic	principles	as	too	strong.
Schroeder	(2011)	objects	that	there	is	still	a	reason,	just	a	weaker	
one.25	He	uses	the	following	case:
24.	Undercutting	defeaters	 suggest	 that	one’s	ground	 for	 the	belief	 is	not	 suffi-
ciently	indicative	of	the	truth	of	the	belief	—	the	ground	here	being	the	experi-
ence.	See	Pollock	1967.
25.	 Schroeder	(2011	fn.	8)	does	not	actually	deny	reasons	holism.	Nevertheless,	
the	argument	he	offers	can	be	naturally	understood	as	an	argument	against	
reasons	holism.
	 darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?
philosophers’	imprint	 –		9		–	 vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019)
6. Hedged Rules 
Let’s	recap.	So	far	I	have	argued	that	it	is	ad	hoc	to	hold	that	simple	
epistemic	rules	are	indefeasible,	and	that	epistemic	rules	are	not	con-
tributory.	My	positive	view	is:	For any (simple or complex) epistemic rule, 
rational agents can acquire evidence that it is not a requirement of rationality, 
causing them to decrease their credence that it is a requirement of rationality. 
If	the	credence	is	low	enough,	the	rule	does	not	apply	to	the	agent	(by	
Anti-Akrasia).
Let’s	connect	this	to	familiar	views	in	ethics.	Recall	Frederick’s	ex-
ample:	 if	Alf’s	promise	 to	Betty	was	made	under	 threat	of	 force,	his	
promise	 fails	 to	engender	 that	duty,	because	 the	 situation	was	duty-
voiding.	So,	starting	with	a	simple	ethical	rule:	
if	you	promised	to	p,	then	you	are	required	to	p
it	 is	plausible	 that	you	have	no reason	 to	p	 if	 the	promise	was	made	
under	duress.	The	simple	ethical	rule	can	be	voided.	In	order	to	allow	
for	this,	we	need	the	full	rule	to	be:	
if	you	promised	to	p,	then	you	are	required	to	p,	unless	
the	promise	was	made	under	duress.	
We’ll	say	that	the	full	rule	is	hedged.28
In	epistemology,	using	the	example	of	Perception,	a	better	specifi-
cation	of	the	rules	would	move	us	from:
28.	This	 idea	 has	 been	 suggested	 in	meta-ethics	 by	Holton	 (2002)	 and	Horty	
(2007).	Horty	writes	 that	 “the	general	principle	 that	 lying	 is	wrong	should	
be	 taken	 to	mean	 simply	 that	 lying	 is	wrong	by	default	—	that	 is,	 to	 a	first	
approximation,	that	once	we	learn	that	an	action	involves	lying,	we	ought	to	
judge	that	 it	 is	wrong,	unless	certain	complicating	factors	 interfere”	(p.	23).	
Holton	suggests	 that	ethical	 rules	need	 ‘That’s	 it’	clauses	stating	 that	 there	
are	no	other	 ethically	 relevant	 features,	 e.g.	 ‘Any	action	 that	has	 such-and-
such	features	and	That’s	It	 is	wrong’.	One	choice-point	here	is	whether	the	
hedge	lists	a	manageable	number	of	exceptions	(e.g.	‘under	duress’)	or	is	a	
place-holder	for	an	open-ended	list	of	exceptions	(e.g.	‘and	there	are	no	other	
relevant	normative	features’).	This	is	the	topic	of	section	8.	See	Field	(2000	p.	
135	and	Appendix)	for	related	points.
Furthermore,	a	motivation	for	wanting	contributory	reasons	in	eth-
ics	does	not	apply	to	epistemology.	A	strong	motivation	for	contribu-
tory	reasons	in	ethics	is	a	need	for	outweighed	reasons.	Dancy	writes:	
Scanlon	[who	is	taken	to	reject	contributory	rules26]	has	
…	deprived	himself	of	the	idea	of	a	defeated	reason,	and	
thereby	 prevented	 himself	 even	 from	 addressing	 the	
question	what	the	appropriate	response	is	to	such	a	thing.	
Normally	we	would	speak	of	 regret	and	 residual	duties,	
but	 if	 all	 conflict	 is,	 as	 Scanlon	 suggests,	merely	 appar-
ent,	 there	 are	no	defeated	 [outweighed]	 considerations	
capable	of	demanding	regret,	and	nothing	to	generate	a	
residual	duty.27	(Dancy	2004	p.	26)
The	 idea	 that	 contributory	 reasons	 keep	 their	 force	 even	 when	 de-
feated	is	most	plausible	in	ethics,	especially	if	we	think	of	our	ethical	
system	as	consisting	in	duties.	Your	duty	not	to	lie	remains,	even	if	you	
have	a	stronger	duty	to	save	a	life	by	lying.	
By	 contrast,	 our	 epistemic	 duties	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 the	 same	
power	to	remain	even	if	defeated.	For	example,	suppose	you	see	a	red-
looking	table	 in	a	situation	where	you	know	you	have	taken	a	drug	
that	makes	blue	things	look	red	and	red	things	look	blue.	You	don’t	
believe	that	the	table	is	red.	Do	you	regret	that	you	have	not	lived	up	to	
your	epistemic	duty	to	believe	things	are	as	they	appear	to	be?	Surely	
not.	A	signature	feature	of	a	violation	of	a	contributory	rule	is	that	it	
involves	a	residual	bad-making	feature.	But	there	doesn’t	seem	to	be	
anything	bad	(morally	or	epistemically)	about	believing	 the	 table	 is	
blue.	So	the	contributory	view	looks	to	be	unmotivated	in	epistemol-
ogy.	So	the	rejection	of	contributory	rules	is	more	plausible	in	episte-
mology	than	in	ethics.	
26.	 I	am	neutral	on	whether	this	is	a	good	interpretation	of	Scanlon.	
27.	 This	 argument	 is	 central	 to	 Dancy’s	 position.	 He	 later	 (p.	 28–9)	 rejects	
Holton’s	Principled	Particularism	for	the	same	reason.
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response,	I	suggest	that	the	agent	can	move	straight	to	a	stable	state	
in	which	 E	 has	 higher	 credence	 than	 before	 and	 that-Perception-is-
a-requirement-of-rationality-in-this-situation	has	lower	credence	than	
before.
So	situations	where	rules	appear	 to	conflict	are	 in	 fact	situations	
where	the	rules	are	incompletely	specified.	This	avoids	the	smell	of	ad	
hoccery	—	we	are	not	asserting	that	rules	are	immune	to	conflicting	ev-
idence;	we	are	placing	limits	on	when	the	rule	applies,	a	move	which	
is	 familiar	 in	ethics	and	philosophy	of	science.31	 It	 is	also	familiar	 in	
epistemology	—	it	is	the	strategy	suggested	by	Lewis	(1980)	regarding	
objective	chance	which	I	develop	in	the	next	section.	
7. Two Types of Inadmissibility
Let’s	start	with	a	simple	credence-chance	link:
Credence-Chance Link:	If	an	agent’s	situation	includes	full	
belief	that	the	chance	of	p	is	x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	
required	to	have	credence	of	p	in	x.
This	rule	does	not	apply	in	all	situations.	An	agent	can	have	evidence	
that	justifies	their	having	credences	that	differ	from	the	chances.	Call	
such	 evidence	 inadmissible.	 The	most	 familiar	 form	 is	 evidence	 that	
gives	us	direct	information	about	the	event.	For	example,	if	you	see	a	
fair	coin	landing	Heads	in	a	crystal	ball	you	know	to	be	reliable,	you	
should	not	have	credence	of	½	that	it	will	land	Heads.	This	is	an	oppos-
ing	defeater.	So	the	Credence-Chance	Link	should	be	hedged.	Indeed,	
Lewis	defended	a	hedged	version	of	the	Credence-Chance	Link	—	the	
Principal	Principle	(PP),	of	which	we’ll	use	a	simplified	version:32
31.	 Compare	Cartwight	(1983),	Pietroski	and	Rey	(1995).
32.	 Precisely,	it	says:	“Let	C	be	any	reasonable	initial	credence	function.	Let	t	be	
any	time.	Let	x	be	any	real	number	in	the	unit	interval.	Let	X	be	the	proposi-
tion	that	the	chance,	at	time	t,	of	A’s	holding	equals	x.	Let	E	be	any	proposi-
tion	compatible	with	X	that	is	admissible	at	time	t.	Then	C(AIXE)	=	x”	(p.	266).	
This	brings	 in	various	 features	which	aren’t	 relevant	 to	our	 concerns.	One	
that	 is	worth	mentioning	 is	 that	Lewis’s	 rule	 requires	 that	 agents	not	only	
have	credences	that	match	the	known	chances,	but	also	update	in	such	a	way	
Perception:	 If	 an	 agent’s	 situation	 includes	 a	 perception	
that	x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	that	
x
to
Hedged Perception:	If	an	agent’s	situation	includes	a	percep-
tion	that	x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	
that	x,	unless	they	have	evidence	against	Perception.29 
What	if	an	agent	does	have	evidence	against	Perception?	I	suggest	we	
take	Hedged	Perception	to	include:
If	they	have	evidence	against	Perception,30	then	their	cre-
dence	 that	Perception	 is	 a	 requirement	of	 rationality	 in	
this	situation	should	decrease.	
Where	 there	 is	moderate	 evidence	 that	 Perception	 is	 not	 a	 require-
ment	of	rationality	in	this	situation,	the	rational	agent	might	retain	a	
middling	credence	 that	Perception	 is	a	 requirement	of	 rationality	 in	
this	situation. Where	there	is	overwhelming	evidence	that	Perception	
is	not	a	requirement	of	rationality	in	this	situation,	the	rational	agent	
might	disbelieve	that	Perception	is	a	requirement	of	rationality	in	this	
situation.	 Assuming	 Anti-Akrasia,	 (which	 links	 beliefs	 about	 the	 re-
quirements	of	rationality	with	requirements	of	rationality),	it	follows	
that	Perception	is	not	a	requirement	of	rationality	in	this	situation.	A	
fortiori,	Perception	is	not	a	requirement	of	rationality	in	all	situations.
A	 referee	 objects	 that	where	 believing	 E	 is	 based	 on	 Perception,	
which	is	then	undermined	by	E,	the	support	for	E	vanishes,	thus	the	
rule	is	believed	again,	and	the	position	is	diachronically	unstable.	In	
29.	Notice	that	although	Hedged	Perception	contains	‘unless’,	it	is	very	different	
from	Titelbaum’s	 restricted	 rules.	Restricted	 rules	 tell	 us	 to	 ignore	 evidence 
that	conflicts	with	the	rules;	hedged	rules	tell	us	to	lower	credence	in	the	rules 
(in	our	situation)	when	there	is	evidence	undermining	them.
30.	I	intend	this	to	cover	cases	where	the	evidence	is	that	Perception	fails	to	ap-
ply	in	their	current	situation,	and	cases	where	the	evidence	is	that	Perception	
fails	to	apply	in	all	situations.	
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to	 have	 credence	 of	 x	 in	 p,	 unless	 they	 have	 evidence-
inadmissible-relative-to-the-Credence-Chance-Link,	 or 
unless they have evidence-inadmissible-relative-to-the-PP*.
I	suggest	that	other	rules	work	the	same	way,	and	that	we	need	to	gen-
eralize	the	notion	of	inadmissibility	to	apply	to	the	other	rules.	
Let’s	work	through	how	this	applies	to	Testimony.	
Testimony:	If	an	agent’s	situation	includes	testimony	that	x,	
the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	that	x.
Like	 the	Credence-Chance	Link,	 this	needs	 to	have	exceptions	built	
in.	One	type	of	exception	occurs	when	the	agent	has	other	evidence	
against	x.	Perhaps	 the	agent	has	directly	 seen	 that	x	 is	 false;	 this	 is	
an	opposing	defeater.	A	different	 type	of	 exception	would	be	 if	 the	
agent	rationally	believes	that	the	person	testifying	is	unreliable;	this	
is	an	undercutting	defeater.	Or	suppose	an	apparently	reliable	agent	
tells	them	that	Testimony	is	false;	this	is	a	more	general	undercutting	
defeater,	relevant	to	other	testifiers	too.	Call	evidence	that	justifies	an	
agent	 in	not	believing	 testimony	 inadmissible-relative-to-Testimony.	So	
Testimony	should	be	hedged	as	follows:
Hedged Testimony:	 If	 an	 agent’s	 situation	 includes	 tes-
timony	 that	 x,	 then	 the	 agent	 is	 rationally	 required	
to	 believe	 that	 x,	 unless they have evidence that is 
inadmissible-relative-to-Testimony.
Mutatis	mutandis	for	other	simple	epistemic	rules	(including	Hedged	
Testimony).	Thus,	I	suggest	that	all	simple	epistemic	rules	are	hedged. 
The	undermining	problems	disappear,	as	the	problem	cases	described	
situations	where	the	agent	does	have	evidence	inadmissible	to	some	
rule,	so	the	agent	has	low	credence	that	the	rule	is	a	requirement	of	
rationality,	so	by	Anti-Akrasia	(which	links	beliefs	about	the	require-
ments	of	rationality	with	the	requirements	of	rationality),	the	rule	does	
not	apply.34	We	have	arrived	at	my	view	that	epistemic	rules	will	be	
34.	Objection:	 Our	 hedged	 simple	 rules	 will	 almost	 never	 apply.	 Hedged	
PP	 If	 an	 agent’s	 situation	 includes	 full	 belief	 that	 the	
chance	 of	 p	 is	 x,	 then	 the	 agent	 is	 rationally	 required	
to	 have	 credence	 of	 p	 in	 x,	unless they have inadmissible 
evidence.	
But	there	is	a	second	type	of	inadmissible	evidence	that	has	not	been	
discussed	 in	 the	 objective	 chance	 literature	—	the	Credence-Chance	
Link	can	have	undercutting	defeaters.	There	might	be	evidence	that	re-
duces	your	confidence	that	a	rule	is	a	requirement	of	rationality.33	Sup-
pose	an	apparently	 reliable	agent	 tells	you	 that	 chance	 is	not	 some-
thing	which	your	credences	should	match.	You	might	be	confused	by	
such	a	statement,	but	this	confusion	is	surely	enough	to	justify	your	
credences’	not	perfectly	matching	the	chances.	Such	evidence	reduces	
confidence	in	the	Credence-Chance	Link.
Similarly,	 suppose	an	apparently	 reliable	agent	 tells	you	 that	 the	
PP	 is	 false	 (i.e.	 even	with	 the	hedge).	 Then	 you	 should	 lower	 your	
credence	that	PP is	a	rule	of	rationality.	So	PP	also	needs	to	be	hedged.	
Just	 as	 the	 hedge	 of	 the	Credence-Chance Link	 generated	 the	 PP,	we	
need	a	new	principle	generated	by	the	hedge	of	the	PP.
One	way	 to	systematize	all	 this	 is	 to	make	 the	concept	of	admis-
sibility	relative	to	a	rule.	So	we	can	restate	PP	as:
PP*:	 If	 an	 agent’s	 situation	 includes	 full	 belief	 that	
the	 chance	 of	 p	 is	 x,	 then	 the	 agent	 is	 rationally	 re-
quired	 to	 have	 credence	 of	 x	 in	 p,	 unless they have 
evidence-inadmissible-relative-to-the-Credence-Chance-Link.
And	PP*	needs	to	be	hedged	in	turn:	
Qualified PP*:	If	an	agent’s	situation	includes	full	belief	that	
the	chance	of	p	is	x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	
that,	given	any	possible	admissible	evidence,	they	will	continue	to	do	so.	We	
could	set	up	all	our	rules	in	the	same	way,	but	I	will	use	the	simpler	formula-
tion.	Thanks	to	x.
33.	 Such	evidence	most	directly	reduces	your	confidence	that	a	rule	is	a	require-
ment	of	rationality	in	your	situation;	a	fortiori	it	reduces	your	confidence	that	
a	rule	is	a	requirement	of	rationality	in	all	situations.
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epistemic	rules,	this	position	is	still	defensible	as	an	epistemic	theory.	
So	in	the	next	section	I	will	defend	an	Uber-rule.
Before	that,	there	is	a	loose	end	to	tie	up.	Suppose	we	accept	hedged	
rules	—	are	they	contributory	or	absolute?	In	the	ethics	case,	we	used:
Hedged, Absolute:	 If	 you	 promised	 to	 p,	 then	 you	 are	 re-
quired	to	p,	unless	the	promise	was	made	under	duress,	
etc.
But	the	alternative	is:	
Hedged, Contributory:	If	you	promised	to	p,	then	you	have	
a	reason	to	p,	unless	the	promise	was	made	under	duress,	
etc.
The	 advantage	 of	 contributory	 rules	 is	 that	 they	 don’t	 undermine	
themselves	or	each	other;	but	we	have	no	need	of	this	advantage	here,	
as	the	hedge	can	ensure	that	there	is	no	conflict.	And	if	there	is	no	con-
flicting	rule,	then	surely	a	promise	to	p	means	that	you	are	required	to	
p;	the	Hedged,	Absolute	rule	is	correct.
The	epistemology	case	looks	similar.	
Hedged, Absolute:	If	it	looks	red,	then	you	should	believe	
it	is	red,	unless	you	rationally	believe	you	have	recently	
taken	a	drug,	etc.
Hedged, Contributory:	 If	 it	 looks	red,	then	you	have	a	rea-
son	to	believe	it	is	red,	unless	you	rationally	believe	you	
have	recently	taken	a	drug,	etc.
The	stronger	Hedged,	Absolute	 rule	 looks	plausible,	 so	 I	 tentatively	
endorse	it.	
8. For the Uber-rule
So	far	I	have	argued	that	the	link	between	descriptive	and	normative	
concepts	can	be	described	only	by	a	tapestry	of	interlocking	hedged	
not	the	simple	rules	with	which	we	began,	but	complex	rules	full	of	
hedges.	
Dancy	(2004)	attributes	an	analogous	view	to	Scanlon	(1998):35
Scanlon’s	 view	…	 seems	 to	 be	 that	…	 there	 are	 no	 ac-
tual	conflicts,	only	appearances	of	conflict.	If	two	of	our	
[rules]	seem	to	get	in	each	other’s	way,	what	this	shows	
is	that	at	least	one	of	them	is	incompletely	specified,	and	
the	matter	 is	resolved	by	a	more	complete	specification.	
Suppose	we	[can	help	someone	in	need	at	the	cost	of	kill-
ing	someone	else].36	The	idea	here	is	that	in	a	proper	un-
derstanding	of	the	[rule]	that	requires	us	to	help	those	in	
need,	there	would	probably	be	included	an	exception	to	
that	duty	for	all	cases	where	to	help	one	we	have	to	kill	
another.	Properly	understood,	therefore,	the	duty	to	help	
cannot	conflict	with	the	duty	not	to	kill.	(p.	25)
But	 a	 new	 danger	 emerges	 if	 the	 complexity	 spirals	 out	 of	 control.	
Starting	with	simple	rules,	can	the	exceptions	be	finitely	stated?	Ideally,	
we	would	like	to	have	finite	exceptions,	as	this	would	allow	a	manage-
able	set	of	rules	that	could	be	used	to	guide	our	deliberation.	
I	 don’t	 know	 if	 this	 is	 possible,	 so	 I	will	 concede	 the	 point,	 and	
defend	the	possibility	 that	 the	exceptions	are	open-ended.	The	 idea	
is	that,	even	if	we	are	left	with	an	infinite	list	of	exceptions	to	simple	
Perception	might	start:	“If	it	looks	like	p,	then	believe	p,	unless	you	have	rea-
son	to	distrust	your	vision	or	….”	Anyone	who	has	ever	experienced	an	illu-
sion	does	have	some	such	reason.	This	point	is	correct	—	hedged	simple	rules	
might	 rarely	apply	 to	any	actual	people	—	but	 this	 is	not	a	problem.	Again,	
compare	the	Principal	Principle.	Lewis	formulated	it	to	apply	only	to	initial	
credence	functions,	so	it	does	not	apply	to	any	real	people.	Nevertheless,	it	is	
(if	correct)	a	substantive	and	informative	rule	of	rationality.
35.	 Dancy	cites	Scanlon	(1998	p.197–200).	But	Dancy	admits	that	the	interpretive	
claim	is	not	beyond	dispute,	and	I	refrain	from	attributing	this	to	Scanlon.
36.	Bizarrely,	the	original	sentence	is	“Suppose	we	face	a	choice	between	killing	
one	person	and	helping	another.”	 I	 take	 it	Dancy	 intended	 to	describe	 the	
example	I	use.
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so	 the	prior	 distribution	 encodes	what	 agents	 should	believe	 given	
any	evidence.	The	prior	distribution	can	encode	an	Uber-rule.
Are	there	any	simple	rules	that	apply	in	all	situations,	i.e.	all	over	
the	Venn	diagram?	I	see	no	reason	to	expect	so.	We	cannot	say	you	
should	believe	your	 senses,	because	 there	 is	possible	evidence	/	ar-
eas	of	 the	Venn	diagram	where	you	should	not	believe	your	senses.	
Indeed,	for	any	simple	rule	you	might	state,	there	is	possible	evidence	
/	areas	of	the	Venn	diagram	where	you	should	not	follow	that	simple	
rule.	The	best	we	could	hope	for	would	be	patterns	in	some	areas	of	
the	Venn	diagram	that	could	be	helpfully	described	with	simple	rules.39 
We	might	make	a	comparison	with	Humean	laws.	For	the	Humean,	
laws	do	not	explain	events;	events	are	fundamental	and	laws	are	de-
rived	 from	events,	 so	Humean	 laws	are	 just	 informative	 summaries.	
Similarly,	in	Bayesian	epistemology	the	priors	are	fundamental;	some	
simple	epistemic	rules	might	be	derived	from	the	priors,	but,	like	Hu-
mean	laws,	they	are	just	helpful	summaries.40
For	a	further	intuitive	argument,	consider	some	difficult	question,	
such	as	 the	correct	 credence	 that	 climate	change	 is	man-made.	 Is	 it	
plausible	that	a	finite	number	of	simple	epistemic	rules	would	gener-
ate	the	rational	credence?	It	strikes	me	as	entirely	implausible.
In	the	rest	of	this	section	we’ll	consider	two	objections	to	the	Uber-
rule	based	on	(i)	guidance	and	(ii)	coherence.
39.	Conditionalization	could	be	a	fundamental	rule,	one	which	uses	totality	facts	
about	agents’	entire	epistemic	state.
40.	Thus	simple	rules	can	still	help	explain	rational	requirements;	we	just	have	to	
remember	that	the	simple	rules	are	themselves	explained	by	the	priors.	So	
this	seems	compatible	with	Christensen’s	comment:	“If	we	ask	why	the	dis-
agreement	of	other	competent	thinkers	with	the	same	evidence	should	affect	
my	confidence,	the	correct	explanation	may	still	be	that	since	their	disagree-
ment	is	evidence	that	my	initial	belief	was	based	on	an	epistemic	error,	it	cre-
ates	rational	pressure	to	give	credence	to	the	claim	that	my	initial	belief	was	
based	on	error,	and	that	…	this	creates	rational	pressure	to	back	off	of	that	
initial	belief	to	at	least	some	extent”	(Christensen	2013	p.	93,	italics	added).	
However,	Christensen	(2010	p.	203–4)	offers	some	considerations	that	sug-
gest	that	some	simple	rules	are	explanatory	in	a	stronger	sense	than	I	allow.	
rules.	Can	these	rules	be	finitely	stated?	If	not,	we	have	a	version	of	
particularism:
Principled Particularism:	Any	finite	set	of	 rules	will	be	 in-
sufficient	to	capture	all	normative	truths.37
Thus	the	connection	between	descriptive	and	normative	truths	is	ex-
pressible	only	with	an	infinitely	long	rule:	an	Uber-rule.	With	this	one	
Uber-rule,	which	presumably	does	not	undermine	itself,	the	problems	
of	undermining	are	avoided.
I	will	defend	the	Uber-rule	in	epistemology.	As	far	as	I	can	tell,	the	
term	‘Uber-rule’	was	introduced	by	Christensen	(2010)	and	described	
as	follows:
Suppose	 we	 specify,	 for	 every	 possible	 evidential	 situ-
ation	 in	which	 an	 agent	may	 find	 herself,	what	 the	 ap-
propriate	 doxastic	 response	 is.	 The	 result	would	 be	 an	
overarching	 rule	which	 took	 into	 account	 every	 sort	 of	
evidence.	We	might	 then	think	of	 that	rule	as	encoding	
the	one	and	only	true	epistemic	[rule].	(p.	203)	
I	add	that	the	Uber-rule	cannot	be	finitely	expressed.	This	position	can	
be	generated	by	conjoining	an	infinite	number	of	simple	rules,	or	pos-
iting	a	finite	number	of	simple	rules	with	at	least	one	infinitely	long	
hedge.	As	the	Uber-rule	applies	in	all	situations,	it	is	unhedged;	I	will	
argue	below	(8.2)	that	it	is	also	defeasible.
So	far	the	only	detailed	discussions	of	the	Uber-rule	have	argued	
against	 it.38	 Let	 me	 sketch	 a	 way	 of	 thinking	 about	 rationality	 that	
makes	an	Uber-rule	plausible.	Instead	of	thinking	about	rationality	as	
emerging	out	of	simple	rules,	think	of	the	Bayesian	approach	where	
agents	 begin	 with	 a	 prior	 distribution	 of	 probabilities.	 Imagine	 all	
epistemically	possible	worlds	on	a	vast	Venn	diagram.	Bayesians	only	
allow	 updating	 by	 conditionalization	 (or	 Jeffrey	 conditionalization),	
37.	 Compare	Holton	(2002)	and	McKeever	and	Ridge	(2006	p.	16).
38.	Christensen	(2010,	2013),	Lasonen-Aarnio	(2014).
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rule	that	is	relevant	to	them	—	it	looks	red,	there	are	no	other	relevant	
features,	so	believe	it	is	red.42
However,	this	position	might	be	harder	to	defend	in	epistemology	
than	in	ethics.	In	ethics,	often	only	a	small	number	of	considerations	
are	relevant	to	whether	a	particular	action	is	right.	But,	turning	to	epis-
temology,	consider	whether	I	should	trust	my	vision	and	believe	there	
is	a	red	table	in	front	of	me.	Presumably	the	track-record	of	my	vision	
is	relevant,	so	every	visual	experience	in	my	life	—	and	whether	it	was	
veridical	—	will	be	relevant.	And	we	already	seem	to	have	a	rule	that	is	
too	complicated	to	guide	me.
At	this	point	we	could	retreat	to	the	view	that	although	we	can	nev-
er	(or	not	always)	say	that	there	are	no	other	relevant	features,	these	
other	relevant	features	can	be	rationally	ignored.	Defending	the	view	
that	there	are	more	reasons	than	we	normally	take	into	account,	Mark	
Schroeder	(2005)	writes:
If	God	made	 a	 list	 of	 all	 of	 the	 pros	 and	 cons	 of	 some	
course	of	action,	it	might	be	infinitely	long.	But	you	can’t	
possibly	take	everything	into	account	—	only	the	reasons	
near	the	top	of	the	list.	(p.	15)
So	we	could	be	guided	by	 the	Uber-rule	by	paying	attention	 to	 the	
most	important	parts	of	the	rule	for	our	situation.	
A	problem	might	remain	 if	 someone	 insisted	 that	guidance	must	
be	provided	by	the	full	epistemic	theory,	i.e.	the	whole	Uber-rule.	The	
full	Uber-rule	cannot	be	finitely	formulated,	and	perhaps	we	cannot	be	
guided	by	rules	we	cannot	formulate.	
But	an	agent	might	be	guided	by	the	rules	without	being	able	to	
formulate	them.	For	example,	when	you	judge	that	a	sentence	is	un-
grammatical,	you	are	guided	by	linguistic	rules	that	you	are	unable	to	
formulate.
Furthermore,	you	might	even	be	disposed	to	get	the	rules	wrong	if	
you	tried	to	formulate	them.	For	example,	Arpaly	(2003)	argues	that	
42.	 See	Väyrynen	(2008)	for	a	detailed	defence	of	a	similar	position	in	metaethics.
8.1. Guidance
Lasonen-Aarnio	 (2014)	 offers	 the	 most	 detailed	 discussion,	 and	 fo-
cusses	on	two	main	worries.	Start	with	the	worry	that	we	cannot	be	
guided	by	the	Uber-rule:41
Now,	the	problem	for	the	Uber-rule	view	is	that	an	Uber-
rule	just	doesn’t	seem	like	the	kind	of	rule	that	can	offer	
genuine	guidance.	For	one,	it	cannot	even	be	expressed	
as	a	set	of	finite,	 informative	generalisations.	…	Even	 if	
one	argues	that	subjects	manage	to	genuinely	follow	the	
Uber-rule	by	employing	more	ordinary	kinds	of	epistemic	
rules	as	heuristic	guides,	the	fact	remains	that	they	need	
guidance	to	follow	the	Uber-rule	itself.	Hence,	the	Uber-
rule	 is	a	very	awkward	candidate	 for	a	rule	that	 is	 itself	
supposed	 to	play	 the	 role	of	offering	genuine	guidance.	
(p.	333)
In	my	view	the	Uber-rule	need	not	offer	guidance.	I	prefer	the	Bayes-
ian	view	above,	according	to	which	agents	are	“guided”	by	their	priors	
and	the	evidence.	
Still,	 Lasonen-Aarnio’s	 worry	 may	 survive	 as	 the	 worry	 that	 we	
mere	mortals	are	unable	to	be	guided	by	the	full	ideal	prior	probability	
function,	which	requires	assigning	probabilities	to	an	infinite	number	
of	propositions.	So	let’s	address	this	worry	in	the	form	that	Lasonen-
Aarnio	puts	it	—	that	the	Uber-rule	cannot	offer	guidance.
In	response,	it	is	arguable	that	an	Uber-rule	could	offer	guidance.	
In	the	happiest	cases,	agents	know	that	the	ceteris	paribus	clause	of	a	
simple	rule	is	true,	i.e.	other	things	are	equal,	so	they	can	be	guided	
by	the	rule.	For	example,	someone	who	has	conclusive	reason	to	be-
lieve	that	their	senses	are	reliable	can	follow	Perception,	and	Percep-
tion	will	be	one	part	of	the	larger	Uber-rule.	Though	never	guided	by	
the	entire	Uber-rule,	agents	might	usually	be	guided	by	the	part	of	the	
41.	 Compare	Boghossian	2008	p.	496.	
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[A]ssume	that	you	are	staring	at	a	chart	representing	the	
Uber-rule:	 for	 each	 possible	 epistemic	 situation	…	 the	
chart	specifies	what	 the	recommendations	made	by	the	
Uber-rule	in	that	situation	are.	…	Now	imagine	that	you	
hear	an	epistemology	oracle	tell	you	that	the	recommen-
dations	made	by	the	Uber-rule	in	the	very	situation	you	
are	in	right	now	are	incorrect.	In	so	far	as	the	rule	is	com-
plete	…	the	chart	must	say	something	about	your	current	
situation.	Imagine	that,	as	the	chart	tells	you,	the	rule	rec-
ommends	being	in	state	S.	But	 in	so	far	as	the	oracle	 is	
to	be	trusted,	doesn’t	her	testimony	act	as	a	higher-order	
defeater	for	any	such	recommendation?	(p.	331)
As	stated,	I	think	this	imagined	situation	is	incoherent.	The	problem	
is	that	we	are	imagining	a	case	where	you	are	told	that	the	Uber-rule	
is	incorrect.	But	we	have	defined	‘Uber-rule’	as	the	correct	rule.	So	any	
rule	that	fails	to	be	correct	isn’t	the	Uber-rule.	So	any	speaker	who	tells	
you	the	Uber-rule	is	incorrect	is	saying	something	incoherent,	and	you	
should	not	follow	their	advice.45	Even	worse,	we’ve	been	told	that	it	is	
an	“epistemology	oracle”	who	is	telling	us	the	Uber-rule	is	 incorrect.	
Presumably,	the	phrase	‘epistemology	oracle’	applies	only	to	someone	
who	 speaks	 the	 truth.	 So	 ‘epistemology	 oracle’	 cannot	 be	 correctly	
applied	to	anyone	who	tells	us	the	Uber-rule	is	incorrect	(under	any	
mode	of	presentation),	as	the	Uber-rule	is	by	definition	correct.
A	coherent	scenario	 in	this	area	 is	 that	a	rational	agent	might	be	
told	something	 false	about	 the	Uber-rule	by	a	plausible-looking	but	
misleading	informant.	And	what	might	be	worrying	Lasonen-Aarnio	
is	the	thought	that,	in	this	scenario,	agents	can	have	rational	doubts	
about	the	content	of	the	Uber-rule.	It	looks	paradoxical	for	the	Uber-
rule	to	apply	in	all	situations,	be	unhedged,	and	yet	be	defeasible.46 
45.	 They	might	say,	“The	rule	you	are	following	is	incorrect”,	but	that’s	a	different	
situation,	as	it	involves	a	different	mode	of	presentation	of	the	Uber-rule.
46.	Compare	Christensen	(2013):	“If	the	agent	continues	to	follow	the	Uber-rule	
while	doubting	its	correctness,	it	seems	inevitable	that	she	will	in	some	cases	
Huckleberry	Finn	is	guided	by	the	true	moral	rules	in	not	turning	in	
an	escaped	slave,	even	if	he	wrongly	believes	that	he	should	turn	in	
the	slave.43	Huckleberry	Finn’s	inability	to	formulate	the	rules	does	not	
stop	him	from	being	guided	by	the	rules.	
Perhaps	our	position	in	epistemology	is	analogous	to	Huckleberry	
Finn’s	position	in	ethics.	We	cannot	formulate	the	Uber-rule	any	more	
than	Huckleberry	Finn	can	 formulate	 the	ethical	 rules.	But	 it	 is	pos-
sible	that	his	compassion	makes	him	perform	the	right	action,	so	there	
is	a	sense	in	which	he	is	guided	by	ethical	rules.	Similarly,	it	is	possible	
that	 our	 good	 sense,	 or	 epistemic	 intuition,	makes	us	 form	 rational	
beliefs,	so	there	is	a	sense	in	which	we	are	guided	by	the	Uber-rule.44 
To	sum	up,	although	the	Uber-rule	is	incompatible	with	some	views	
that	 involve	strong	requirements	on	our	ability	 to	 formulate	and	be	
guided	by	normative	rules,	such	strong	requirements	can	be	rejected.
8.2 Coherence
Lasonen-Aarnio’s	other	worry	is	that	there	might	be	no	Uber-rule	to	
be	 found	—	“finding	a	 rule	not	 susceptible	 to	defeat	 is	 surely	harder	
than	merely	defining	one	to	be	such!”	(p.	331).	The	idea	seems	to	be	
that	the	concept	of	an	Uber-rule	might	be	incoherent,	just	as	the	con-
cept	of	a	square	circle	is.	
One	might	 immediately	be	 suspicious	here	—	surely,	 for	 any	pos-
sible	evidential	state,	there	is	a	rational	response,	and	the	Uber-rule	
states	what	the	rational	responses	are.	Nevertheless,	Lasonen-Aarnio	
offers	the	following	case	to	defend	this	position:
43.	 See	Raz	(2000)	 for	 further	discussion.	One	might	be	 tempted	 to	appeal	 to	
the	familiar	distinction	between	a	theory	of	rightness	and	a	decision-making	
procedure	(Bales	1971).	But	we	are	working	only	with	the	subjective	ought,	
so	the	theory	of	rightness	looks	irrelevant	(or	perhaps	better:	the	distinction	
collapses).
44.	 A	different	problem	with	 an	 infinitely	 long	Uber-rule	 is	 that	we	would	be	
unable	to	grasp	epistemic	concepts.	Thus,	Jackson,	Pettit	and	Smith	(2000)	
give	a	semantic	objection	to	particularism.	This	seems	to	be	a	good	reason	for	
positing	a	long	but	finite	rule.
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needs	to	perfectly balance	the	possibility	that	your	credence	should	be	
less	than	70%.47 
As	a	final	point	in	defence	of	the	Uber-rule,	it	is	worth	emphasiz-
ing	 Holton’s	 point	 that	 Principled	 Particularism	 is	 compatible	 with	
utilitarianism:
[S]uppose	you	were	a	utilitarian.	Then	you	couldn’t	de-
termine	which	action	to	perform	on	the	basis	of	a	list	of	
pleasures	and	pains	caused	by	possible	actions	of	yours.	
You	would	need	to	know,	in	addition,	that	these	were	all	
the	pleasures	and	pains	that	each	action	caused;	and	that	
these	were	all	your	possible	actions.	(p.	206)
47.	 What	about	Titelbaum’s	memorable	phrase	—	mistakes	about	rationality	are	
mistakes	of	rationality?	I	can	endorse	this	phrase	if	we	fill	it	out	as	follows:	
  Titelbaum’s-Principle-I-Accept:	For	any	given	agent	and	situation,	if	they	are		
	 mistaken	about	what	they	should	believe	in	their	situation,	then	they	are		
	 making	a	mistake	of	rationality.	
	 This	follows	from	the	internalist	intuition	that	agents	have	epistemic	access	
to	the	rationality-makers.	But	one	can	have	rational	false	beliefs	about	what	
others	should	believe:	
  Titelbaum’s-Principle-I-Deny:	For	any	given	agent	and	situation,	if	they	are	
	 mistaken	about	what	one	should	believe	in	a	situation	other	than	their		
	 own,	then	they	are	making	a	mistake	of	rationality.	
	 The	difference	can	be	put	 in	 terms	of	 the	scope	of	 the	quantifiers.	For	any	
agent	and	situation,	 there	are	epistemic	 rules	 they	ought	 to	believe	are	 re-
quirements	of	rationality;	but	there	are	no	epistemic	rules	they	ought	to	be-
lieve	are	requirements	of	rationality	in	all	situations.	Another	way	of	putting	
this	is	that	you	can	be	rationally	mistaken	about	what	someone	else	should	
believe,	 but	 not	 about	what	 you	 should	 believe.	Why	 the	 asymmetry?	 Be-
cause	what	an	agent	should	believe	depends	on	their own	higher-order	beliefs	
about	rationality,	whereas	what	an	agent	should	believe	does	not	depend	on	
someone else’s	higher-order	beliefs	about	 rationality.	The	asymmetry	can	be	
read	off	the	Anti-Akratic	rule	(this	is	an	ad	hominem	criticism	of	Titelbaum,	
as	Anti-Akrasia	is	central	to	his	theory)	—	it	is	irrational	to	believe	p	and	be-
lieve	that	it	is	irrational	to	believe	p;	it	is	not	irrational	to	believe	p	and	believe	
that	it	is	irrational	for	someone	else	to	believe	p.	Titelbaum	(2015)	mentions	
this	possible	asymmetry	but	immediately	rejects	it:	“[E]very	plausible	story	
I’ve	been	able	to	come	up	with	is	generalizable:	it	applies	just	as	well	to	an	
agent’s	conclusions	about	what’s	rationally	required	in	other	situations	as	it	
does	to	conclusions	about	what’s	required	in	her	current	situation”	(p.	276).
I	think	paradox	can	be	avoided.	Let’s	work	through	a	case.	Suppose	
the	sum	total	of	your	evidence	is	a	current	red	experience.	Suppose	the	
Uber-rule	says	that	the	rational	response	to	this	evidence	is	to	be	90%	
certain	that	there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	you.	You	are	rational,	so	you	
are	90%	certain	that	there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	you.	And	you	are	
reflective,	so	you	have	the	second-order	belief	that	the	Uber-rule	says	
that	agents	with	the	sum	total	of	a	red	experience	should	be	90%	cer-
tain	that	there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	them.	Say	you	are	n%	certain	
of	this	second-order	belief.	Now	add	an	informant	who	says	(falsely)	
that	the	rational	response	to	your	current	red	experience	is	to	be	only	
50%	certain	that	there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	you.	
Distinguish	first-order	and	second-order	responses.	The	most	 im-
mediate	 response	 is	 lowering	 your	 second-order	 credence	 that	 the	
Uber-rule	says	that	agents	with	exactly	the	evidence	of	a	red	experi-
ence	should	be	90%	certain	that	there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	them.	
This	falls	from	n%.	The	first-order	response	is	that	your	credence	that	
there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	you	drops	below	90%.	If	you	fully	trust-
ed	the	informant,	it	would	fall	to	50%,	but	let’s	say	it	settles	at	70%.
There	is	no	violation	of	the	Uber-rule.	Your	epistemic	position	has	
changed	—	your	evidence	now	includes	the	red	experience	and the tes-
timony.	And	it	is	compatible	with	this	story	that	the	recommendation	
of	 the	Uber-rule	 for	 someone	with	 this	 evidence	 is	 “Have	 70%	 cre-
dence	that	there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	you.”
No	paradox	so	far.	Perhaps	the	problem	is	that	you	can	doubt	the	
content	of	the	Uber-rule.	You	are	not	certain	that	the	Uber-rule	recom-
mends	a	90%	credence	that	there	is	a	red	object	to	agents	with	just	a	
red	experience.	Similarly,	you	should	not	be	certain	 that	70%	 is	 the	
rational	credence	in	your	current	situation.	But	a	rational	agent	may	
doubt	the	Uber-rule	without	believing	that	the	beliefs	it	prescribes	are	
irrational.	The	possibility	that	your	credence	should	be	more	than	70%	
violate	 [Anti-Akrasia]”	 (p.	 93).	The	example	 shows	how	we	 can	doubt	 the	
Uber-rule	without	Akrasia.
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This	is	a	challenge	to	Bayesianism,	which	models	agents	as	proba-
bilistic,	and	so	requires	that	agents	are	certain	of	tautologies.	I	think	
the	 Bayesian	 should	 respond	 that	 their	 models,	 like	 most	 models,	
make	idealizations	—	that	is,	they	make	assumptions	that	are	known	
to	be	false	in	order	to	make	the	model	easier	to	work	with.	Probabilism	
is	such	an	assumption.	So	probabilistic	agents	in	Bayesian	models	are	
idealized;	but	they	are	not	necessarily	ideal,	in	the	sense	of	being	per-
fectly	rational.	We	have	unfortunate	terminology	where	‘ideal’	can	be	
used	to	refer	to	either	of	these	properties.	(Compare:	There	is	nothing	
rational	about	an	ideal	gas.	The	assumption	of	the	idealness	of	a	gas	is	
analogous	to	the	assumption	of	the	probabilism	of	agents.50)
In	 one	 sense,	 this	 type	 of	 revisability	 is	 stronger	 than	Quine	 al-
lowed,	for	one	way	Quine	thinks	we	might	give	up	a	sentence	is	a	way	
that	we	would	naturally	describe	as	a	change	in	the	meaning	of	the	
sentence.	(Quine	denied	that	we	could	separate	meaning	change	from	
belief	 change,	 due	 to	 his	 rejection	 of	 the	 analytic/synthetic	 distinc-
tion.)	Whereas	I	am	happy	to	talk	about	propositions	and	inclined	to	
hold	 that	no	proposition	 is	 immune	 from	 revision.	But	 there	 are	 re-
lated	Quinean	views	that	I	do	not	endorse.
First,	I	do	not	reject	the	a	priori.	I	think	the	Principal	Principle	(and	
other	principles)	are	a	priori	yet	defeasible.	Some	philosophers	iden-
tify	the	a	priori	with	immunity	from	revision	—	so	I	reject	the	“a	priori”	
only	in	this	sense.51 
Second,	 I	 do	not	 reject	 analyticity.	 Let	 an	 analytic	 sentence	be	 a	
sentence	that	one	can	be	in	a	position	to	justifiably	believe	in	virtue	of	
understanding	it.	This	allows	the	existence	of	defeaters	that	block	the	
justification.	One	can	reject	an	analytic	sentence	as	false	if	one	mistak-
enly	doubts	that	it	is	analytic.52	Imagine	being	told	that	‘All	bachelors	
50.	Hájek	2006.
51.	 Casullo	(2003)	argues	that	there	is	no	experiential	indefeasibility	condition	
in	the	concept	of	a	priori	justification;	and	Summerfield	(1991)	and	Thurow	
(2006)	argue	that	a	priori	justification	is	defeasible	by	experience.
52.	 Alternatively,	 perhaps	 analytic	 sentences	 can	be	 rejected	 in	 the	 sense	 that	
they	are	believed	to	fail	to	usefully	apply	to	the	world.	For	example,	one	can	
No	matter	how	much	of	 the	world	we	describe,	 it	 is	not	 enough	 to	
ensure	 that	 an	 act	 is	 right	—	rightness	depends	on	 the	whole	world,	
just	as	generalizations	like	 ‘all	swans	are	white’	do.48	Similarly,	 if	we	
focus	on	narrow-scope	rules	with	descriptive	antecedents	without	to-
tality	facts,	then	we	can	never	stop	at	finite	rules	—	what	you	ought	to	
believe	depends	on	your	whole	mental	state.	But	this	doesn’t	rule	out	
generalizations.	So	this	version	of	particularism	is	not	devastating	for	
normative	theorizing.	
This	completes	my	defence	of	the	Uber-rule.	In	the	next	section,	I	
will	connect	the	resulting	position	to	broader	issues	regarding	defea-
sibility	and	the	a	priori.
9. Against Certainty 
I	argued	in	the	previous	section	that	even	the	Uber-rule	can	be	ratio-
nally	doubted.	This	supports	a	view	associated	with	Quine	—	that	no	
statement	 is	 immune	 from	 revision.	Epistemic	 rules	 are	 good	 candi-
dates	for	statements	that	are	immune	from	revision,	so	by	arguing	that	
they	are	not	immune	from	revision,	the	general	case	that	no	statement	
is	immune	from	revision	is	supported.	
Still,	I	have	only	discussed	narrow-scope	rules	connecting	descrip-
tive	with	normative	 statements.	My	position	does	not	 entail	 that	no	
statement	is	immune	from	revision.	For	example,	one	might	still	hold	
that	rational	agents	are	certain	of	tautologies.	
Nevertheless,	I	think	rational	doubt	can	be	raised	even	about	tau-
tologies,	 and	 for	 similar	 reasons.	 For	 example,	 suppose	 a	 heavenly	
voice	tells	you	that	p-and-not-p,	or	tells	you	that	your	credences	should	
sum	to	0.8.	Baffling	situations	for	sure,	but	they	seem	to	provide	some	
reason	to	doubt	tautologies.49
48.	Compare	Schroeder	2011.
49.	 See	Williams	(forthcoming)	for	a	defence	of	“rational	illogicality”;	Schechter	
(2013)	offers	related	arguments	against	being	certain.	At	odds	with	this	is	the	
literature	based	on	McFetridge	(1990)	(e.g.	Hale	2002,	Ahmed	2000,	Leech	
2015),	which	seems	to	assume	that	there	must	be	some	rules	which	are	im-
mune	to	doubt.
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are	men’	 is	 false	by	a	misleading	but	eminent	source.	Or	being	told	
that	you	have	ingested	a	drug	that	generates	false	beliefs	about	which	
sentences	are	analytic.	It	might	be	rational	to	reject	the	sentence,	so	
even	analytic	sentences	are	not	immune	from	revision.53
10. Conclusion
The	problems	of	this	paper	were	generated	by	the	paradox	that	emerg-
es	in	situations	where	epistemic	rules	undermine	themselves	or	each	
other.	One	way	to	avoid	paradox	is	to	maintain	that	epistemic	rules	are	
indefeasible	and	ignore	all	opposing	evidence.	I	have	argued	instead	
that	we	should	think	of	simple	epistemic	rules	as	hedged	rules.	They	
apply	only	if	agents	don’t	have	evidence	that	is	inadmissible	relative	to	
those	rules.	I	have	defended	the	view	that	the	only	rule	that	applies	in	
all	situations	is	an	Uber-rule	which	states	what	agents	should	believe	
given	any	possible	evidence.	But	even	the	content	of	the	Uber-rule	can	
be	rationally	doubted.54
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